|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| ||||
|
|
||||||||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Peace Talks - Vrede Samesprekings - Friedensgespräche
|
Samesprekings vir Vrede (1988) Samesprekings tussen die RSA, Kuba en die MPLA-bewind het in Mei 1988 'n aanvang geneem in die soeke na 'n onderhandelde skikplan vir SWA. Op 2 Augustus 1988 het die eerste belangrike deurbraak gekom toe SA tydens samesprekinge in Geneve 'n aantal vredesvoorstelle voorgele het. Hierdie voorstelle het eerstens voorsiening gemaak vir die staking van alle vyandelike optredes vanaf 10 Augustus 1988. Tweedens moes onverwyld 'n aanvang gemaak word met die onttrekking van Kubaanse en SA magte aan Angola. SA het onderneem dat sy troepe-onttrekking op 1 September 1988 afgehandel sou wees. Derdens moes 'n skakelkomitee wat sou besluit oor die nodige meganismes vir die onttrekkingsfase gestig word. Van besondere belang was die voorstel dat die VVO se Resolusie 435 vanaf 1 November 1988 ge'i'mplementeer sou word. As 'n uitvloeisel hiervan sou 'n vrye algemene verkiesing op 1 Junie 1989 in SWA/Namibie gehou word. SA het ook die netelige kwessie van die koste verbonde aan die toepassing van Resolusie 435 aangevoer. Daar is bereken dat dit sowat Rl,5 miljard sou kos om die resolusie, ingevolge waarvan SWA onder VV-toesig en met 'n VV-vredesmag onafhanklik moet word, in werking te stel. Tydens Samesprekings by Ruacana op 16 Augustus 1988 is ooreengekom dat 'n Gesamentlike Militere Monitorkommissie (GMMK), bestaande uit verteenwoordigers van FAPLA en die Kubaanse magte en offisiere van die SA Weermag, saamgestel sou word. Hierdie GMMK sou die onttrekking van die SA magte aan Angola moniteer. Op dieselfde dag het die SWA GM in Windhoek bekend gemaak dat veertien SWAPO-terroriste in die voorafgaande week in skermutselings met die veiligheidmagte dood is. Op 22 Augustus het militere verteenwoordigers van SA, die SWA GM en 'n gesamentlike Kubaans/Angolese afvaardiging by Ruacana 'n formele verdrag onderteken wat vir die staking van vyandelikhede tussen die twee partye voorsiening gemaak het. In 'n verklaring wat na die ondertekening uitgereik is, is bekendgemaak dat die GMMK vanaf 30 Augustus op 'n daaglikse basis sou vergader. Die volgende ronde Samesprekings het op 24 Augustus in Kongo Brazzaville begin. Op dieselfde dag het die Staatspresident, mnr P.W. Botha, tydens 'n gesamentlike sitting van die Parlement oor die situasie in suidwestelike Afrika gemaan dat "die ervaring geleer het dat ons nie te vroeg ons verwagtinge te hoog moet stel nie." Tydens die Samesprekings in Brazzaville is die tydtafel vir die Kubaanse onttrekking aan Angola bespreek. In hierdie verband is geen besluit geneem nie en die partye het ooreengekom om hul Samesprekings by 'n latere geleentheid in Brazzaville te hervat. Hierdie Samesprekings het SWAPO allermins van sy terreurveldtog laat afsien. Op die aand van 1 September is twee mense dood en minstens vyftien beseer toe twee kragtige ploftoestelle die middestad van Windhoek geruk het. Die Samesprekings is op 6 September in Brazzaville voortgesit. Gedurende hierdie ontmoeting is daarvan kennis geneem dat die Suid-Afrikaanse magte ooreenkomstig die Geneefse Protokol teen 1 September aan Angola onttrek het en die Gesamentlike Militere Monitorkomrnissie bevredigend funksioneer. Die onderskeie afvaardigings het ook hul verbintenis tot Resolusie 435 herbevestig. Wat die Kubaanse onttrekking betref, het Kuba aangebied om sy magte oor 'n tydperk van drie jaar aan Angola te onttrek. Tydens die gesamentlike sitting in Brazzaville het die Suid-Afrikaanse afvaardiging berigte oor die beweerde verskeping van bykomende Kubaanse troepe en wapentuig te berde gebring. Die Kubaanse verteenwoordigers het hierdie beweringe, wat onder meer deur amptenare van die Amerikaanse regering in Washington gemaak is, ten sterkste ontken. Hulle het aangevoer dat daar voortgegaan word met die normale bevoorrading van soldate asook met die aflos van troepe wat hul dienstermyne in Angola voltooi het. Die Samesprekings het ten einde geloop sonder dat enige belangrike besluit geneem is en die onderskeie afvaardigings is huis toe om aan hul regerings verslag te doen. Die samesprekings is eers op 26 September in Brazzaville hervat. Tydens die eerste gesamentlike sitting op 27 September, het die Kubaanse afgevaardigdes Suid-Afrika daarvan beskuldig dat hy van 'n vertragingstaktiek gebruik maak. Die onttrekking van die Kubaanse magte aan Angola was egter 'n groter struikelblok. Ofskoon 'n gesamentlike verklaring tot die teendeel na die samesprekings uitgereik is, het dit begin deurskemer dat 1 November 1988, die voorgestelde implementeringsdatum vir Resolusie 435, nie meer gehandhaaf sou kon word nie. Meer as 'n maand het verloop voordat die partye op 10 November in Geneve vir die volgende ronde samesprekings byeengekom het. By hierdie geleentheid het die tydtafel vir die Kubaanse onttrekking weer eens die spilpunt van onderhandelinge gevorm en die onderskeie partye het daadwerklik gepoog om tot 'n vergelyk te kom. Sekere voorstelle rakende die Kubaanse onttrekking is tentatief aanvaar en deur die terugkerende partye aan hul regerings voorgele. Dit is dan ook later aanvaar. Op 17 November het die Algemene Vergadering van die WO opnuut 'n beroep op die RSA gedoen om van SWA afstand te doen. Dit het ook die Kubaanse onttrekking aan Angola as voorvereiste vir die implementering van Resolusie 435 verwerp en sy steun aan SWAPO herbevestig. Hiermee is die besluite wat enkele dae vantevore by Geneve geneem is, algeheel ge'i'gnoreer. Die samesprekings is op 1 Desember in Brazzaville voortgesit. By hierdie samekoms het die Direkteur-generaal van Buitelandse Sake, mnr Neil van Heerden, en sy span onderhandelaars met die Kubaanse en Angolese afgevaardigings onderhandel oor die verifikasie van die Kubaanse onttrekking. Die Minister van Verdediging, genl Magnus Malan, het tydens 'n vleuelparade te Dunnottar op 1 Desember weer eens na die Suid-Afrikaanse magte se optredes in Angola verwys. Hy het aangevoer dat die SAW 'n oorwinning oor die gesamentlike magte van Kuba en die MPLA-regering behaal het soos wat nog nooit voorheen in die moderne geskiedenis van semi-konvensionele oorlogvoering behaal is nie. Genl Malan het bygevoeg dat hierdie oorwinning Kuba en die MPLA-bewind na die onderhandelingstafel gedwing het. "Dit is 'n gees van oorwinning dat ons ons magte aan Angola onttrek het. Daar was nooit meer as drieduisend man nie en hulle het 'n voorgeskrewe en beperkte taak gehad," het hy daaraan toegevoeg. Op die volgende dag het genl Malan saam met mnr Pik Botha na Brazzaville vertrek om 'n formele ooreenkoms met Kuba en die MPLA-regering te onderteken. Nadat hulle op die lughawe Mayo-Mayo geland het, is die twee ministers deur die Suid-Afrikaanse onderhandelingspan ingelig oor die verwikkelinge op die eerste dag se samesprekings. Hierna is verder beraadslag met die Ameri-kaanse Adjunk-minister van Buitelandse Sake belas met Afrika en voorsitter van die Brazzaville-beraad, dr Chester Crocker. Alles het daarop gedui dat 'n belangrike deur-braak gemaak is en die Brazzaville-protokol spoedig onderteken sou word. Dit het egter nie by hierdie ronde samesprekings gebeur nie. Op 4 Desember het die Suid-Afrikaanse afvaardiging na Suid-Afrika teruggekeer. Die Suid-Afrikaners se klaarblyklike skielike vertrek is hewig deur die Kubaanse en Angolese afgevaardigdes gekritiseer. Die Suid-Afrikaanse afgevaardiging was op 13 Desember weer terug in Brazzaville. Hierdie keer het geen wesentlike geskille opgeduik nie en die Brazzaville-protokol kon onderteken word. Die ondertekening het plaasgevind in die Palais de Peuple (die volkspaleis) voor meer as 200 verteenwoordigers van talle lande, die Kongo en die internasionale media. Luidens die bepalings van die Brazzaville-protokol is by die Sekretaris-generaal van die VVO aanbeveel dat 1 April 1989 sou dien as implementeringsdatum vir Resolusie 435. Die partye sou ook op 22 Desember in New York ontmoet vir die ondertekening van die finale drieparty-ooreenkoms en die bilaterale verdrag tussen Kuba en die MPLA-bewind. Die Brazzaville-protokol het ook voorsiening gemaak vir die daarstelling van 'n gesamentlike kommissie wat sou dien as 'n forum vir die bespreking en oplossing van vraagstukke rakende die interpretasie en toepassing van die latere drieparty-ooreenkoms. Verder is ooreengekom dat krygsgevangenes na die ondertekening van die drieparty-ooreenkoms op 22 Desember uitgeruil sou word. Na die ondertekening van die Brazzaville-protokol het president Jose Eduardo dos Santos van Angola 'n beroep op internasionale flnansiele bystand gedoen ten einde die Kubaanse onttrekking moontlik te maak. Hy het die koste van die onttrekking op Rl 840 miljoen (800 miljoen dollar) gestel. In Lusaka het SWAPO se inligtings en publisiteits-sekretaris, mnr Hidipo Hamutenja, namens die organisasie die ondertekening van die Brazzaville-protokol ver-welkom. Die ondertekening van die Brazzaville-protokol was nie die enigste nuuswaardige gebeurtenis daardie dag in die geskiedenis van Suidwes-Afrika nie. Op dieselfde dag het twee Angolese MiG 21-vegvliegtuie die grens tussen Angola en SWA oorgesteek en suidwaarts gevlieg. Een vliegtuig het later teruggedraai, maar die tweede het 'n noodlanding op 'n plaas naby Otjiwarongo gedoen. Die vlieenier het ongedeerd daarvan afgekom en is krygsgevange geneem. Na hierdie voorval het die Minister van Verdediging, genl Malan, gese dat ofskoon die vliegtuie deur die veiligheidsmagte op hul radarskerms gevolg is, hulle nie afgeskiet is nie omdat die Suid-Afrikaanse Lugmag in die gees van die Brazzaville-protokpl opgetree het. Die RSA se Staatsveiligheidsraad het die teks van die voorgestelde drieparty-ooreenkoms tydens 'n buitengewone sitting op 20 Desember in Kaapstad goedgekeur. Daardie aand was die Suid-Afrikaanse afvaardiging onder leiding van mnr Pik Botha reeds onderweg na die VVO in New York vir die ondertekening van die ooreenkoms. Die drieparty-ooreenkoms is op 22 Desember 1988 deur die drie ministers van Buitelandse Sake onderteken. Die verigtinge wat bestem was om 'n luisterryke geleentheid te wees, is ontsier toe mnr Pik Botha se Kubaanse eweknie, mnr Isidiro Malmierca Peoli, 'n striemende aanval op Suid-Afrika gedoen het. Dit het mnr Botha genoop om horn tereg te wys en tot 'n openbare debat uit te daag. Mnr George Schultz, die Amerikaane minister van Buitelandse Sake, wat as voorsitter van die verrigtinge opgetree het, het hierop tussenbeide getree. Na die ondertekening van die drieparty-ooreenkoms het mnr Schultz die verdrag aan die Sekretaris-generaal, dr Javier Perez du Cuellar oorhandig. Daarmee is die belangrikste ooreenkoms op die weg na vrede in suidwestelike Afrika bekragtig. Die weg is ook gebaan vir die implementering van Resolusie 435 en die onderhandelde skikplan in SWA. Ingevolge hierdie ooreenkoms sou die onderhandelde skikplan op 1 April 1989 geimplementeer word. Die RSA se militere magte moes ooreenkomstig die bepalings van Resolusie 435 vanaf hierdie datum aan Suidwes-Afrika onttrek word. Op 13 Mei 1989 sou daar hoogstens 13 000 Suid-Afrikaanse soldate in SWA wees en op 24 Junie sou hierdie syfer hoogstens 1 500 wees. Dit het beteken dat slegs \ 500 op stemdag (1 November 1989) in bepaalde basisse saamgetrek sou wees. Een week na die sertiflsering van die verkiesingsuitslag deur die VVO sal alle oorblywende Suid-Arikaanse troepe aan SWA onttrek word. Die SWA GM sou ses weke na die implementering van Resolusie 435 (dws op 13 Mei 1989) gedemobiliseer word. Die bilaterale verdrag tussen Kuba en die MPLA-bewind rakende die Kubaanse onttrekking aan Angola is ook op 22 Desember 1988 onderteken. Dit het voorsiening gemaak vir die onttrekking van sowat 50 000 Kubaanse soldate aan Angola oor 'n tydperk van 27 maande. Die onttrekking en herontplooiing van Kubaanse magte sou reeds met die ondertekening van die twee ooreenkomste op 22 Desember 'n aanvang neem en teen 1 April 1989 moes die onttrekking van 3 000 soldate afgehandel wees. Die onttrekking sou gemonitor word deur 'n span van 90 man wat as UNAVEM (United Nations Angola Verification Mission) bekend sou staan. UNAVEM is onderverdeel in 'n hoofkwartier in Luanda en verskillende waarneming-spanne wat op 1 April 1989 ontplooi sou word. Volgens die tydtafel vir die Kubaanse onttrekking moet alle Kubaanse troepe teen 1 Augustus 1989 teruggetrek wees tot noord van die aangepaste 15de breedtegraad. Op 1 November 1989 (die verkiesingsdatum in Suidwes-Afrika) moet alle Kubaanse soldate tot noord van die aangepaste 13de breedtegraad onttrek wees. Op dieselfde datum moet die helfte van alle Kubaanse magte in Angola onttrek wees en op 1 April 1990 twee derdes. Teen 1 Oktober 1990 moet 76 persent van die troepe al vertrek het. Teen 1 Januarie 1991 moet daar nie meer as 12 000 troepe in Angola wees nie en ses maande later moet alle Kubaanse troepe uit die land wees. Teen die einde van 1988 het die algemene veiligheid-situasie in SWA gunstiger as in die vorige jaar daar uitgesien. Kontakte en hinderlae met terreurbendes van SWAPO het byvoorbeeld van 206 in 1987 tot 132 in 1988 afgeneem, terwyl mynvoorvalle van 97 in 1987 tot 89 in 1988 gedaal het. Intimidasievoorvalle deur terreurbendes het van 56 in 1987 tot 32 in 1988 afgeneem. Daarteenoor het die aantal sabotasievoorvalle toegeneem, naamlik van 93 in 1987 tot 111 in 1988. Wegstaan-bestokings deur SWAPO-terroriste het insgelyks toegeneem van 35 in 1987 tot 41 in 1988. Altesaam 72 burgerlikes se dood in 1988 kan aan SWAPO en ander oorlogsverwante aksies toegeskryf word. Dit toon 'n afname met 1987 toe 126 burgerlikes dood is. In hul volgehoue optrede om die mense van SWA/Namibie te beveilig, het die Veiligheidsmagte 330 terroriste doodgeskiet. Die prys wat SWAPO vir sy mislukte rewolusionere aanslag van 22 jaar moes betaal, was hoog: vanaf daardie eerste skermutseling op 26 Augustus 1966 tot aan die einde van 1988, is 11 335 terroriste in gevegte met die veiligheidsmagte dood. Vir SWA was 1988 sekerlik 'n historiese jaar waarin belangrike nuwe mylpale bereik is. Op die vooraand van die nuwe jaar wou dit voorkom asof die einde van die sogenaamde "grensoorlog" in Suidwes-Afrika naby was. Die grootskaalse binnesypeling van SWA deur 'n groot aantal swaar gewapende SWAPO-terroriste op 1 April 1989 en die bloedige gevegte wat hierop gevolg het, was egter 'n goeie aanduiding van die feit dat talle struikel blokke in 1989 nog oorkom sou moes word om die ideaal van 'n onafhanklike Namibie te verwesenlik. |
Discussions for Peace (1988) Discussions between the RSA, Cuba and the MPLA regime commenced in May 1988 to consider the feasibility of a negotiated settlement plan for SWA. On 2 August 1988 the first important breakthrough came when SA submitted a number of proposals at the discussions in Geneva. Firstly, the proposals provided for the cessation of all hostilities with effect from 10 August 1988. Secondly, a start should be made for the immediate withdrawal of Cuban and S A forces from Angola. SA gave an undertaking that withdrawal of its troops would be completed on 1 September 1988. Thirdly, a liaison committee should be formed to decide on the necessary mechanisms for the withdrawal phase. Of paramount importance was the proposal that UN Resolution 435 should be implemented from 1 November 1988. Thereafter a free election would be held in SWA/Namibia on 1 June 1989. South Africa also raised the knotty question regarding the cost of implementing Resolution 435. It was estimated that it would cost approximately Rl,5 billion to implement the Resolution for SWA's independence under the supervision of the UN and a UN peace-keeping force. During the discussions at Ruacana on 16 August 1988 it was agreed that a Joint Military Monitoring Commission (JMMC), consisting of representatives of FAPLA and Cuban forces and officers of the SA Defence Force, be formed. This JMMC would monitor the withdrawal of the SA forces from Angola. On the same date the SWATF in Windhoek announced that fourteen SWAPO terrorists had been killed in skirmishes with the security forces the previous week. At Ruacana on 22 August military representatives of SA, the SWATF and a combined Cuban/Angolan delegation signed a formal agreement which provided for the cessation of hostilities between the two parties. The agreement also provided for the establishment of the proposed Joint Military Monitoring Commission (JMMC). In a statement issued after the signing of the agreement it was announced that the JMMC would meet daily with effect from 30 August. The next round of discussions began in Congo Brazzaville on 24 August. On the same day, the State President, Mr P.W. Botha, warned during a joint session of Parliament, with reference to the situation in South Western Africa, that "experience has taught us not to expect too much too soon." At the talks in Brazzaville the timetable for the Cuban withdrawal was discussed. No decision was made and the parties agreed to continue their discussions in Brazzaville at a later date. These discussions in no way deterred SWAPO from continuing with its terrorist campaign. On the evening of 1 September two people were killed and at least fifteen injured when two powerful explosive devices rocked the central part of Windhoek. The discussions were resumed in Brazzaville on 6 September. At this meeting it was noted that the South African forces had, in terms of the Geneva Protocol, withdrawn from Angola before 1 September and that the Joint Military Monitoring Commission was functioning satisfactorily. The respective delegations re-affirmed their commitment to Resolution 435. Concerning the withdrawal of the Cubans, Cuba offered to withdraw its forces from Angola over a period of three years. During the joint session at Brazzaville the South African delegation raised the issue of the alleged shipment of additional Cuban troops and ordnance. The Cuban delegation strongly denied these allegations which were, inter alia, made in Washington by officials of the American Government. They stated that they were continuing with normal supplying of their soldiers as well as the replacing of troops who had completed their term of duty in Angola. The discussions ended without adopting any important decision and the respective delegations return home to report to their governments. The discussions were only resumed in Brazzaville on 26 September. At the first combined session on 27 September the Cuban delegation accused South Africa of using delaying tactics. The biggest stumbling block, however, was the withdrawal of the Cuban forces from Angola. Although a combined statement to the contrary was issued after the discussions, it became clear that 1 November 1988, the proposed date of implementation of Resolution 435, was no longer possible. More than a month elapsed before the parties met on 10 November at Geneva for the next round of talks. On this occasion the timetable for the Cuban withdrawal became a focal point of the negotiations and the respective parties made a concerted efford to reach agreement. Certain proposals concerning the Cuban withdrawal were tentatively agreed upon and were submitted to their governments. These were later accepted. On 17 November the General Assembly of the UN again appealed to the RSA to relinquish SWA. It also rejected the withdrawal of Cubans from Angola as a prerequisite for the implementation of Resolution 435 and confirmed its support for SWAPO. By this action the decisions taken a few days before at Geneva, were completely ignored. The discussions were continued in Brazzaville on 1 December. At this meeting the Director General of Foreign Affairs, Mr Neil van Heerden, and his team of negotiators negotiated with the Cuban and Angolan delegations for verification of the Cuban withdrawal. The Minister of Defence, General Magnus Malan, again referred to the activities of the South African forces in Angola at a passing out parade at Dunnottar on 1 December. He mentioned that the SADF gained an impressive victory over the forces of Cuba and the MPLA government of a magnitude which has not yet been achieved in the modern history of semi-conventional warfare. General Malan added that his victory forced Cuba and the MPLA regime to the conference table. "It is in a spirit of victory that our forces were withdrawn from Angola. There never was more than three thousand men and they had a prescribed and limited task." The following day General Malan accompanied Mr Pik Botha to Brazzaville to sign a formal agreement with Cuba and the MPLA Government. On their arrival at Mayo-Mayo, the two ministers were briefed by the South African negotiating team on developments on the first day. Thereafter further discussions were held with the Deputy Secretary for African Affairs and Chairman of the Brazzaville meeting, Dr Chester Crocker. There was every indication that an important breakthrough had been made and that the Brazzaville Protocol would soon be signed. This, however, did not materialise at this round of talks. The South African delegation returned to South Africa on 4 December. The obvious and sudden departure of the South Africans was severely criticised by the Cuba and Angolan delegates. The South African delegation was back in Brazzaville on 13 December. This time no fundamental differences occurred and the Brazzaville Protocol was signed. The signing ceremony took place in the Palais de Peuple (the people's palace) in the presence of 200 representatives of many countries, the Congo and the international media. In terms of the provisions of the Brazzaville Protocol it was recommended to the Secretary General of the UN that 1 April 1989 be the date of implementation of Resolution 435. The parties would also meet in New York on 22 December to sign the final tripartite agreement and the bilateral treaty between Cuba and the MPLA government. The Brazzavill Protocol also provided for the setting up of a combined commission to act as a forum for discussion and solving matters concerning the interpretation and application of the subsequent tripartite agreement. It was further agreed that prisoners of war would be exchanged after the tripartite agreement was signed on 22 December. After signing the Brazzaville Protocol, President Jose Eduardo dos Santos of Angola made a plea for international financial assistance to finance the withdrawal of the Cubans. He estimated the cost at Rl 840 million (800 million dollars). In Lusaka SWAPO's secretary for information and publicity, Mr Hidipo Hamutenja, welcomed the signing of the Brazzaville Protocol on behalf of the organisation. The signing of the Brazzaville Protocol was not the only newsworthy happening on that day in the history of South West Africa. On that day two Angolan MiG 21 fighter aircraft crossed the border and flew in a southerly direction. One of the aircraft later returned but the second made a forced landing on a farm near Otjiwarongo. The pilot landed safely and was taken prisoner. After this incident the Minister of Defence, General Malan, said that although the aircraft were observed on radar screen by the security forces, they were not shot down because the South African Air Force acted in keeping with the spirit of the Brazzaville Protocol. The State Security Council of the RSA approved the provisions of the proposed tripartite agreement at an extraordinary meeting held in Cape Town on 20 December. That evening the South African delegation under the leadership of Mr Pik Botha was already on its way to the UN in New York to sign the agreement. The tripartite agreement was signed on 22 December 1988 by the three Ministers of Foreign Affairs. The func tion which was intended to be a lustrous occasion, was marred when Mr Botha's Cuban counterpart, Mr Isidiro Malmierca Peoli made a scathing attack on South Africa. This compelled Mr Botha to rebuke him and to challenge him to a public debate. Mr George Shultz, the American Secretary of State, who acted as chairman of the meeting, then intervened. After the tripartite agreement was signed, Mr Schultz handed it to the Secretary General, Dr Javier Perez De Cuellar. Thus the most important agreement, which paved the way to peace in South Western Africa, was ratified. The way was also paved for the implementation of Resolution 435 and the negotiated settlement plan for SWA. In terms of this agreement, the negotiated settlement plan would be implemented on 1 April 1989. The RSA's military personnel would, in terms of the provisions of Resolution 435, be withdrawn from South West Africa from this date. On 13 May 1989 there would be a maximum of 13 000 South African soldiers in SWA and on 24 June this figure would be no more than 1 500. This meant that only 1 500 would be in specific camps on polling day (1 November 1989). One week after certification by the UN of the result of the elections, all remaining South African troops would be withdrawn from SWA. The SWATF had to be demobilised six weeks after the implementation of Resolution 435 (on 13 May 1989). The bilateral treaty between Cuba and the MPLA government concerning the Cuban withdrawal from Angola, was also signed on 22 December 1988. This provides for the withdrawal of approximately 50 000 Cuban soldiers from Angola over a period of 27 months. The withdrawal and regrouping of Cuban forces were to start after the signing of the two agreements on 22 December and by 1 April 1989 the withdrawal of 3 000 soldiers should have been finalised. The withdrawal would be monitored by a team of 90 men known as UNAVEM (United Nations Angola Verification Mission). UNAVEM consisted of a headquarters in Luanda and several observation teams to be deployed on 1 April 1989. According to the timetable for the Cuban withdrawal all Cuban troops should have withdrawn by 1 August 1989 to the north to the adjusted 15th parallel. On 1 November1989 (the polling date in South West Africa) all Cuban soldiers should be withdrawn north of the adjusted 13th parallel. On the same date half of all Cuban forces in Angola should be withdrawn and on 1 April 1990 two thirds. By October 1990, 76 per cent of the troops should have left. By 1 January 1991 there should not be more than 1 200 troops in Angola and, six months later, all Cuban troops should have left the country. By the end of 1988 the security situation generally was more favourable than in the previous year. Confrontations and ambushes with terrorist gangs of SWAPO for example decreased from 206 in 1987 to 132 in 1988, whilst landmine incidents decreased from 97 in 1987 to 89 in 1988. Instances of intimidation by terrorist gangs decreased from 56 in 1987 to 32 in 1988. On the other hand the number of sabotage incidents increased from 93 in 1987 to 111 in 1988. Stand-off bombardments by SWAPO terrorists likewise increased from 25 in 1987 to 41 in 1988. The death of 72 civilians in 1988 can be ascribed to SWAPO and other military actions. This reflects a decrease compared with 126 civilians killed in 1987. In their sustained efforts to safeguard people of SWA/Namibia the security forces shot 330 terrorists. The price SWAPO had to pay for its failed revolutionary onslaught of 22 years was high: since the skirmish on 26 August 1966, to the end of 1988, 11 335 terrorists were killed in battles with the security forces. For SWA 1988 was surely a historical year during which important landmarks were reached. On the eve of the new year it appeared that the end of the so-called "border war" in South West Africa was in sight. The large scale infiltration of SWA by a large number of heavily armed SWAPO terrorists on 1 April 1989 and the bloody battles that ensued indicated that many stumbling blocks remain to be overcome in 1989 before the ideal of an independent Namibia can be achieved.
|
Gespräche für den Frieden (1988) Die Diskussionen zwischen der RSA, Kuba und die MPLA-Regime begann im Mai 1988 an die Machbarkeit einer Verhandlungslösung Plan für SWA prüfen. Am 2. August 1988 die erste große Durchbruch kam, als SA eine Reihe von Vorschlägen vorgelegt bei den Gesprächen in Genf. Erstens, die Vorschläge für die Einstellung aller Feindseligkeiten mit Wirkung vom 10 August 1988 vorgesehen. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| ||||
|
|
||||||||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
